Requirements: What Asgaya Must Achieve
đź“– Unfamiliar terms? See the glossary for definitions.
The ultimate goal: Bitcoin Cash merchant adoption
Why remittances? A niche where we can extract value from legacy providers (5-8% fees) and redirect it to merchants as adoption incentive.
The Three Core Requirements
1. Permissionless
No central authority, anyone can participate
What this means:
- No custody (users control their keys)
- No KYC (peer-to-peer coordination)
- No central server (bulletin board on BCH blockchain)
- Autonomous execution (covenants handle settlement)
Why it matters:
- Censorship resistance (no entity can shut down)
- Global accessibility (works for unbanked populations)
- Permissionless innovation (anyone can build clients)
Design choices driven by this:
- Payment-first covenants (no funds locked by intermediary)
- Nostr for coordination (encrypted P2P messaging)
- NFTs on BCH blockchain as bulletin board (no central database)
- Cash Accounts as universal identifier (no phone number registry)
2. Compliance
Legal to operate without MSB licenses
Regulatory frameworks analyzed:
EU (operational target - Spain/Venezuela corridor):
- No custody = no CASP license (MiCA Article 3)
- No intermediation = no Payment Institution (PSD2)
US (reference framework - widely understood terminology):
- No money transmission = no MSB registration (FinCEN)
- No intermediary role = no state licenses
Why both?
- EU law governs the Spain-Venezuela corridor (operational compliance)
- EU sets the higher bar (if compliant in EU, likely compliant globally)
- US terminology (MSB, money transmission) is more familiar in crypto
- Future expansion requires understanding both frameworks
Design strategy: Engineer for EU compliance first (strictest requirements), validate against US framework (most discussed in crypto space).
What this means:
- Clear transaction separation (remittance vs commerce)
Why it matters:
- Regulatory sustainability (can’t be ordered to shut down)
- Global operation (no jurisdiction restrictions)
- Permissionless participation (no entity needs license to provide infrastructure)
Design choices driven by this:
- Payment-first covenants (Isabel receives fiat BEFORE funding covenant)
- Two-transaction model (MarĂa → Elena remittance, Elena → Carlos commerce)
- Bank traceability (Bizum includes full identity, legal recourse via courts)
- H€/HAu restricted minting (utility tokens at covenant endpoints, not money substitutes)
- ⚠️ NO P2PKH proxy patterns (custody + intermediation = licensing required)
Compliance is a constraint we wish didn’t exist, but can’t ignore. May 9, 2026 was the day we discovered our elegant, simple escrow-based architecture was illegal under MiCA. The payment-first covenant design is harder to build, harder to explain, and requires more coordination—but it’s the only path to permissionless operation within EU law. This requirement doesn’t make the design better; it makes it legally possible.
3. Price Stability
Merchants need certainty, not ±20% swings
What this means:
- Merchants can stabilize received BCH (H€/HAu tokens)
- Senders protected from covenant abort tail risk (H€ minting option)
- Recipients can cash out quickly (merchant network for liquidity)
- BCH as fallback (system works even if stability layer exhausted)
Why it matters:
- Merchant retention (volatility kills adoption within weeks)
- Sender protection (didn’t sign up for 7% loss if covenant aborts)
- Network effects (stable value increases circulation velocity)
Design choices driven by this:
- H€/HAu stability tokens (AnyHedge-backed, auto-renewing)
- 7% volatility buffer in covenants (absorbs typical price swings)
- Bull pool structure (Suso provides long positions Phase 0)
- Merchant auto-stabilization (convert BCH → H€/HAu on receipt)
Sub-Requirements
Each core requirement has specific implementation constraints:
Permissionless Sub-Requirements
- Offline-capable (intermittent connectivity supported)
- Minimal hardware (RFID cards for recipients, smartphones for merchants)
- Minimal knowledge (simple UI, no crypto jargon)
- Self-custody education (mandatory backup verification)
- Capital efficiency (no permanently locked funds, all participants can recover capital)
Compliance Sub-Requirements
- No custody at any point (including temporary/intermediary)
- No intermediation (even automated)
- Clear legal standing (bank transfers traceable, court precedent)
- Market-rate exchanges only (no hidden markups, verifiable rates)
- Users can verify rates match public market data (CoinGecko, DolarAPI)
- Zero markup on EUR/BCH or BCH/VES exchanges
- Freedom on convenience, ZERO flexibility on exchange rates
- Prevents replication of legacy extraction (Western Union 2-3% hidden markups)
Volatility Protection Sub-Requirements
- Multiple stability options (H€, HAu, BCH - user choice)
- Automatic stabilization (merchant bot handles conversion)
- Quick cash-out paths (merchant liquidity network)
- Graceful degradation (BCH fallback if pool exhausted)
Requirement #6: Seller Buffer Recovery
Discovered during Phase 1 implementation (July 2026)
The edge case:
t=0: Covenant funded (0.0075 BCH total)
├─ Payment: 0.007 BCH (sender's capital)
└─ Buffer: 0.00049 BCH (seller's capital)
t=60: ⏰ Covenant expires
├─ Recipient can NO LONGER claim (past expiry)
└─ Sender device offline/lost/crashed
t=60+: đź”’ FUNDS LOCKED
├─ Recipient blocked (expired)
├─ Sender can't refund (offline)
└─ Seller STUCK (no recovery path)
Without seller recovery: Seller’s buffer capital is permanently locked if sender goes offline after covenant expires.
What this means:
- Seller must have independent recovery path after expiry
- Cannot depend on sender being online to recover own capital
- Three recovery paths needed: recipient claim, sender refund, seller split
Why it matters:
- Capital efficiency: Sellers provide liquidity infrastructure - buffer can’t be locked indefinitely
- System robustness: Works even when devices fail/go offline (real-world failure modes)
- Economic sustainability: Sellers need predictable capital turnover to operate
Design choices driven by this:
function sellerRecoverBuffer(sig sellerSig, datasig oracleSig, bytes oracleMessage) {
// After expiry, seller can split covenant:
// - Payment → sender address (fair, even though sender offline)
// - Buffer → seller (recovers own capital)
require(oracleTimestamp >= expiryOracleTime); // Only after expiry
// ... fair split logic ...
}
How it interacts with other requirements:
- Permissionless: No participant’s capital can be permanently locked (even by device failure)
- Compliance: Seller gets own capital back, sender’s capital returned to sender (no seizure)
- Volatility Protection: Seller buffer returned → can be used for next covenant → liquidity maintained
This requirement emerged from actual chipnet testing, not initial design. Real-world testing revealed the edge case where sender device failure after expiry would lock seller’s operational capital.
How Requirements Drive Design
Example 1: Payment-First Covenants
- Permissionless: No custody (Isabel never locks funds before receiving payment)
- Compliance: No intermediation (no entity holds funds between parties)
- Result: Counterintuitive but critical design choice
Example 2: H€/HAu Tokens
- Volatility Protection: Merchants get stable value
- Compliance: Multiple assets (EUR, gold) prove “utility tool, not money”
- Permissionless: Bull pool operator chooses assets (Asgaya doesn’t dictate)
- Result: Legal defense architecture + product feature
Example 3: Nostr Blacklist
- Permissionless: No central authority controls blacklist (user bots post independently)
- Compliance: Discourages fraud without becoming intermediary
- Result: Distributed reputation without central database
Example 4: Three-Path Covenant Recovery
- Permissionless: All participants can recover capital (recipient claim, sender refund, seller split)
- Capital Efficiency: Seller buffer can’t be locked by sender device failure
- Result: Robust covenant design that handles real-world failure modes
What’s NOT a Core Requirement
Speed:
- Not a requirement (5 min to 4 hours is acceptable)
- Faster than Western Union (1-2 days) anyway
- Recipient’s decision delay, not technical limitation
Cost:
- Important but derivative (permissionless + no intermediation = low cost)
- <1% achieved by market rates + no markup
- Result of architecture, not primary driver
Scalability:
- Important but premature (Phase 0 validates demand first)
- BCH handles volume (10-minute blocks, low fees)
- Bulletin board scales via NFT pruning (later optimization)
History & Evolution
Key milestones:
- February 2026: Initial requirements identified (flawed, missing compliance)
- April 2026: Compliance requirement added (everything clicked)
- May-June 2026: Volatility protection elevated to core (H€/HAu development)
- June 2026: 3-core framework finalized (Permissionless, Compliance, Volatility)
- July 2026: Seller buffer recovery requirement discovered (Phase 1 chipnet testing revealed edge case)
Success Criteria
This architecture succeeds when:
- âś… Permissionless achieved:
- Anyone can participate without permission
- No entity can shut down the protocol
- Users maintain custody throughout
- âś… Compliance achieved:
- No licenses needed to operate infrastructure
- Legal to use in Spain, Venezuela, and target corridors
- Regulatory risk minimized
- âś… Volatility protection achieved:
- Merchants retain 80%+ after 6 months
- Senders protected from covenant abort losses
- H€/HAu tokens circulate (not just held)
Phase 0 validates: Do these requirements translate to real-world adoption?
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Related: Constraints